Continuing a series of posts based on the famous missive that helped define the United States position in the world following the Second World War. I am taking relevant sections of George Kennan’s “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” (1947) and transposing them to suggest that the policy of containment he proposed then, in relation to the Soviet Union, can and perhaps should, be applied to current conflicts, even though there are radical differences between the Cold War era and now.
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Original:
Now it must be noted that through all the years of preparation for revolution, the attention of these men, as indeed of Marx himself, had been centered less on the future form which Socialism would take than on the necessary overthrow of rival power which, in their view, had to precede the introduction of Socialism. Their views, therefore, on the positive program to be put into effect, once power was attained, were for the most part nebulous, visionary and impractical. beyond the nationalization of industry and the expropriation of large private capital holdings there was no agreed program. The treatment of the peasantry, which, according to the Marxist formulation was not of the proletariat, had always been a vague spot in the pattern of Communist thought: and it remained an object of controversy and vacillation for the first ten years of Communist power.
The circumstances of the immediate post-revolution period — the existence in Russia of civil war and foreign intervention, together with the obvious fact that the Communists represented only a tiny minority of the Russian people — made the establishment of dictatorial power a necessity. The experiment with war Communism” and the abrupt attempt to eliminate private production and trade had unfortunate economic consequences and caused further bitterness against the new revolutionary regime. While the temporary relaxation of the effort to communize Russia, represented by the New Economic Policy, alleviated some of this economic distress and thereby served its purpose, it also made it evident that the “capitalistic sector of society” was still prepared to profit at once from any relaxation of governmental pressure, and would, if permitted to continue to exist, always constitute a powerful opposing element to the Soviet regime and a serious rival for influence in the country. Somewhat the same situation prevailed with respect to the individual peasant who, in his own small way, was also a private producer.
Transposition:
Now it must be noted that through all the years of preparation for their attacks, the attention of these men (sic), as indeed of Bin Laden himself, had been centered less on the future form which the reclamation of the “peninsula” would take than on the necessary overthrow of rival power which, in their view, had to precede the takeover. Their views, therefore, on the positive program to be put into effect, once power was attained, were for the most part nebulous, visionary and impractical. There was no agreed program. There was most generally a fissure between activists like Bin Laden and the clerics who from place to place led or dictated to movements that embraced terrorism.
The circumstances of the the period leading up to 9/11 helped to solidify the resolve of the movement by achieving advances without suffering major setbacks. 9/11 marked a serious advance and served mainly to galvanize both sides in the conflict, while reducing the Western response almost to a childish war mentality with virtually no appreciation for the nature of the opposition or understanding of its basic aims. The leverage of 9/11 and the aftermath probably was as seismic as the forces that created the Soviet Revolution. The financial jolt to the “West” more than likely amazed the attackers as much as it surprised Americans.
